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The “Great Recession” that began in 2008 plunged the economy into long-
lasting stagnation with high unemployment, depressed output and very low
inflation. This crisis, whose exceptional duration is difficult to explain using the
theoretical tools of contemporary macroeconomics, invites us to enrich funda-
mental analysis. Conceptualizing secular stagnation is then based on the
introduction of market imperfections such as credit rationing on the financial
market as well as nominal rigidities on the labour market. The resulting equilib-
rium is characterized by the underemployment of factors of production (high
unemployment, low capital accumulation) associated with a fall in prices (defla-
tion) and monetary policy that is inactive because of the zero lower bound
constraint on the key rate. In a period of secular stagnation, the impact of
economic policies is affected, and many Keynesian properties appear: a defla-
tionary impact of supply policies, ineffective conventional monetary policy and
a positive effect of public spending, although limited by the crowding out of
private investment.
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The economic and financial crisis of 2008 caused a severe reces-
sion that has been characterized by an unusually slow recovery
(Summers, 2013 and 2014; Rawdanowicz et al., 2015). There are two
types of issues posed about the causes of the insufficient recovery. First,
potential growth has been weakened, reflecting a lack of supply.
Second, the output gap might be abnormally persistent, that is to say,
the economies are having difficulty absorbing demand deficits.
1. This article takes up, updates and extends an OFCE Note published in 2016. We would like to
thank Sandrine Levasseur and the anonymous referee for their numerous and useful remarks.Revue de l’OFCE, 157 (2018)
Gilles Le Garrec and Vincent Touzé70The weakening of potential growth could result from a lack of tradi-
tional factors (low productivity gains, rising social inequalities, aging of
the active population, globalization, scarcity of raw materials, etc.) but
also hysteresis effects (Keightley et al., 2016) since the crisis could have
“permanently damaged” the factors of production (destruction of
productive capital, depreciation of the human capital of the unem-
ployed, decrease in investment). As for the persistence of the output
gap, this could reveal an inability to bring the economy towards full
employment or at least towards the frictional unemployment rate,
hence the hypothesis that stagnation has become sufficiently persistent
to be deemed “secular”.
The hypothesis of secular stagnation was first raised in 1938 in a
speech by Hansen published in 1939 as an article entitled “Economic
Progress and Declining Population Growth”. This explored insufficient
investment in the United States and a decline in the population after a
long period of economic and demographic expansion. The secular
stagnation hypothesis is interpreted as an abundance of savings that
pushes the “natural” real interest rate (defined by Wicksell in 1898 as
the real interest rate compatible with full employment) below zero.
However, if the real interest rate remains above the natural rate over a
long period, this results in a chronic deficit not only of global demand
but also of investment, which depreciates the growth potential. The
very weak inflation and even deflation observed since the beginning of
the crisis underlines the relevance of the secular stagnation hypothesis
in accounting for the current economic situation.
In support of this thesis, it should be noted that as a result of the
2008 crisis, public debts have increased significantly, rising from
62.5% to 106.1% in the United States and from 69% to 89% in the
euro zone (from 68% to 96% in France, but just 65% to 68% in
Germany after peaking at 81% in 2010). Long-term interest rates have
nevertheless remained remarkably low, with 10-year yields on US,
German and French government bonds averaging 2.2%, 0.38% and
0.75%, respectively, in the third quarter of 2017. The low level of long-
term rates could mean that the markets do not anticipate an increase in
inflation in the near future. With this in mind, Summers (2016)
concluded that the state of stagnation will persist.
The purpose of this article is to present the concept of secular stag-
nation as a new field of macroeconomic analysis. The first section
reviews the factual analysis, which raises the question of whether the
Macroeconomics in the Age of Secular Stagnation 71Great Recession caused a lasting change in the economy, thereby
requiring a need to review the fundamentals of macroeconomic anal-
ysis. The second part examines how a secular stagnation equilibrium
can be characterized from a theoretical point of view. The third part
then considers how effective economic policy can be in an economy
frozen in a state of secular stagnation. The final part offers a conclusion.
1. The Post-crisis Economy: A Lasting Change?
1.1. An abnormally slow recovery and blocked monetary policy
The economic crisis of 2008 has hit the developed countries hard
(Le Garrec and Touzé, 2017a). It caused a fall in GDP relative to its
potential level2 (Chart 1). The difference with potential, i.e. the output
gap, widened to 4.5% in the United States in 2009 compared with the
euro zone's peak of 3.6% in 2013. The growth rate of potential GDP
(Chart 2) has also deteriorated due not only to the disappearance of
companies and a decline in investment but also to a reduction of the
labour force in the United States. Before the crisis (1998-2007 period),
the average growth rate of potential GDP was 2.7% in the United
States and 1.9% in the euro zone. Following the crisis (2009-2018), the
average has been only 1.6% in the United States and 0.8% in the euro
zone, reflecting a lasting change.
Excess production has led to a significant decline in the inflation
rate (Chart 3). On average over the period 1998-2007, it fluctuated
around 2.7% in the United States and 2% in Europe. After the crisis,
the inflation rate fell to almost zero before rising again very slowly.
Over the period 2008-2018, the average inflation rate was down by an
average of one point. 
Before the crisis, the average unemployment rate (Chart 4) hovered
around 4.9% in the United States and 8.8% in the euro zone. Employ-
ment paid a heavy price for the crisis. The unemployment rate rose to
almost 10% in the United States and 12% in the euro zone. A change
came earlier in the United States, where the unemployment rate began
falling in 2011. This was achieved at the cost of a reduction in the
labour force participation rate (Chart 5), which may well reflect long-
term discouragement among a section of the working-age population.
2. The measurement of potential output is a subject of debate – see in this regard Sterdyniak
(2015).
Gilles Le Garrec and Vincent Touzé72The turnaround came later in Europe on average, from 2014, and has
in contrast been accompanied by a rise in participation rates.   
     
Chart 1. The output gap
As a percentage of potential output
Dotted line: average for the period.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Economic Outlook (OECD).
Chart 2. Growth rate of potential production
In %
Dotted line: average for the period.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Economic Outlook (OECD).
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 In %
Dotted line: average for the period.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Economic Outlook (OECD).
Chart 4. Unemployment rates
As a percent of the active population
Dotted line: average for the period.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Economic Outlook (OECD).
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Gilles Le Garrec and Vincent Touzé74Many developed countries have resorted to fiscal policy to deal with
the crisis, first in automatic mode (increased social spending and lower
tax revenues) and then in a voluntary way. The aim was to support
economic activity, but also to protect the financial sector, which had
been severely weakened by the depreciation of its assets. In a third
phase, due to the high levels of public debts and public deficits and
thus in order to protect their solvency, the States were compelled to
increase compulsory contributions and tighten up public spending.
The constraints were more pronounced in southern Europe because of
fiscal rules and the sovereign debt crises that hit these countries, which
led to soaring interest rates and a partial default on Greek debt.
In response to the financial crisis, the central banks lowered their
key interest rates (Chart 6). The rate cut was sharp and quick in the
United States. In Europe, it took place later and was initially a little
more limited. Rates have reached a very low level. With the return of a
low level of unemployment in the United States and a potential
increase in production, the key interest rate has risen slightly there
since December 2015, with the last rise in March 2018 putting the rate
at 1.75%. In the euro zone, the key interest rate has been zero since
March 2016. It is difficult for the European Central Bank (ECB) to go
down any further as adopting a negative interest rate would mean that
Chart 5. Participation rates
As a percent of the working-age population
Dotted line: average for the period.
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Economic Outlook (OECD).
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Macroeconomics in the Age of Secular Stagnation 75the ECB would have to pay banks to borrow. Moreover, in the presence
of negative rates, economic agents would be more inclined to keep
their savings in a monetary form with zero interest rates. It is said in this
situation that the nominal rate is constrained by a zero lower bond
(ZLB). The heterogeneity existing between euro zone countries,
particularly in terms of public debt and bank liabilities, has forced the
ECB not to change the level of the key rate for a long time, even
though some countries such as Germany and the Netherlands are
seeing a return to full employment.  
1.2. Productivity underestimated?
The US economist Robert Gordon sees the 2008 crisis as a symptom
of a downward trend in productivity that clearly pre-dates the crisis.
According to his calculations (Gordon, 2003), hourly productivity grew
at an annual rate of 2.7% in the United States during the period 1950-
1973 (4.4% in Europe), while the rate came to only 1.4% in the period
1973-2000 (2.4% in Europe). Based on these downward trends in
productivity growth, Gordon (2014) predicted that by 2100 the
standard of living (measured by real per capita income) would be rising
each year by only 0.2% per capita, i.e. a level of growth similar to that
observed before the first industrial revolution, which began in the late
eighteenth century.
Chart 6. Key interest rates
in %
Source: US Fed and ECB.
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Gilles Le Garrec and Vincent Touzé76Humans' innovative capacity is behind this change: after the steam
engine, the automobile, electricity and digital technology, “break-
through” technologies that are able to make deep transformations in
the productive system have become rare. Robert Gordon brings in
other causes for the decline in the growth rate of living standards:
population aging, the stagnation of educational levels, increasing
inequality and too much public debt. One could add the scarcity of
natural resources (raw materials, natural resources) and negative exter-
nalities related to pollution and global warming.
Gordon's thesis is debated on several levels. First, the supposed
weakness in productivity growth imposes, de facto, a constraint on
supply, which should have an inflationary impact, whereas we observe
very low inflation. In addition, he is accused of being overly pessimistic
about the potential of future innovations. The technological changes
associated with digital technology could herald new sources of growth.
Certainly, any process of innovation plays a role in the destruction of
the old models of production, which can generate difficult transitions
as productive capital and job positions disappear. However, the emer-
gence of more efficient production systems and vectors of new
products is helping to boost productivity. Finally, to echo Solow's
famous paradox in 1987 (“You can see the computer age everywhere
but in the productivity statistics”), one can question the statistical
robustness of Gordon's results. They could be linked to problems in
measurement (Aghion and Antonin, 2018). While the nominal wealth
produced can be calculated by summing up all the value added at
current prices of the production units, the volume / price breakdown is
more delicate. To do this, we generally rely on measures of value added
at constant prices to deduce deflators. Even if the calculation is simple,
the method may be biased. Indeed, for new products or products
whose quality has been greatly improved, the choice of a past refer-
ence price is particularly complex.
Aghion et al. (2017) propose an alternative measure of productivity.
They rely on a Schumpeterian model that incorporates a process of
creative destruction. Using US data, they consider that productivity has
been underestimated by an average of 0.6 point per year over the
1983-2013 period. This result is significant and can be interpreted to
mean that the decline in productivity growth observed by Gordon is
not fully proven.
Macroeconomics in the Age of Secular Stagnation 77Another interpretation of this result is that statistics overestimate
inflation. In the context of secular stagnation, if the effective produc-
tivity growth is structurally stronger than what is measured, there must
be concern about the consequences of inflation that is even lower than
that measured, which reinforces the possibility of creeping deflation.
1.3. The dangers of deflation (or overly weak inflation)
The post-crisis period marks a singular economic episode since it
contradicts the principle that an accommodating monetary policy
should favour overheating and inflation (Le Garrec and Touzé, 2017a).
The crisis has clearly provoked disinflationary and even deflationary
pressure.
This weak inflation has, of course, resulted from an aggravated
global context that has led to a fall in commodity prices. However, the
deterioration of private and public sector balance sheets has also
played an important role. On the one hand, with a growing risk of
private defaults, banks have become more demanding with regard to
the distribution of credit. On the other hand, companies have tried to
clean up their balance sheets. They have notably been able to reduce
their investments. This double contraction helped to trim the outlets
for savings, which then became overabundant, thus favouring defla-
tionary pressures as aggregate demand fell and savings shifted towards
less risky assets (monetary deposits, government bonds and real
estate). To explain these mechanisms, Koo (2011) developed an anal-
ysis of the recession based on balance sheets. Another approach to
these mechanisms developed by Fisher in 1933 focused on “deflation
by debt” to explain the Great Depression (Challe, 2000).
From the consumer's point of view, lower prices have the merit of
boosting purchasing power. However, from the point of view of
economic equilibrium, deflation or too little inflation are problematic
because of the nominal rigidities resulting from exchange contracts
defined in nominal terms. Indeed, a reasonably positive inflation allows
for adjustment through prices. For example, for company managers, it
is difficult, to reduce the nominal wages recorded for employee
payrolls because these are fixed contractually. On the other hand,
when there is inflation, it is easy to lower real wages by freezing the
nominal amount or by indexing it below the level of inflation. Thus, as
is seen in the results of Verdugo (2013), the wage rigidity observed in
the French labour market partly explains the rise in unemployment
Gilles Le Garrec and Vincent Touzé78following the crisis. More specifically, estimates show that the real
(constant composition) wage should have been 1.5% lower in 2011 to
be consistent with past indexing.
In addition, low inflation has a significant fiscal cost. Indeed, the
rate of inflation is a natural rate of depreciation of the public debt. As
inflation increases, the real value of the public debt decreases, which
reduces the need for fiscal efforts in the future.
Finally, deflation can render conventional monetary policy ineffec-
tive. Indeed, to maintain the level of inflation close to its target, the
central bank could have to set its nominal policy rate at a negative
level, which is hardly possible for the reasons previously mentioned.
The key rate is then limited by the zero lower bound (ZLB). 
1.4. The return of macroeconomic policies to support demand: 
towards an exit from the crisis?
Central banks had to be inventive both to boost the economy and to
generate inflation, because they were constrained by an already very
low key rate. They have implemented less conventional monetary poli-
cies than those based on the key rate, which sets the marginal price of
liquidity or conventional refinancing operations. The abundance of
liquidity has been made possible thanks to massive buybacks of debt
securities. This policy has helped to reduce the liabilities of the private
sector. These unconventional policies mean that the key rate is no
longer the best indicator of the monetary facilities granted by the
central bank. Wu and Xia (2015) calculated an implicit monetary policy
rate by developing an extension of Black's (1995) financial model. The
result is that the implicit rate has been negative in the United States
since July 2008, and has been persistently negative in Europe since
December 2011 (Chart 7). According to their calculations, unconven-
tional monetary policies would thus have made it possible to circumvent
the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate.
Despite the already deteriorated state of the public finances (high
levels of debt accumulated even before the crisis, automatic stabilizers
that aggravated public deficits), there was a turn to fiscal policy. In the
United States, the 2009 Obama Plan injected nearly USD 800 billion of
public spending, or about 5.5% of US GDP. The new president, Donald
Trump, has announced that he wants to increase the public deficit. In
Europe, since September 2015, the Juncker Plan to provide public
support for investment projects has been part of a recovery process. At
Macroeconomics in the Age of Secular Stagnation 79the end of 2016, the European Commission asked Member States with
budget margins to work towards an expansive fiscal policy. In October
2017, the French government announced a plan to boost investment
by around 57 billion euros to finance the ecological transition, the
training of young people with low skills, and the modernization of
public activities, transport, agriculture and the health system. Policies
to support public or private investment have the merit of strength-
ening demand in the short term, with inflationary effects, while
increasing the long-term productive potential.
These changes mark a turning point relative to the policies to
support supply that gained some consensus prior to the crisis.
Numerous studies3 show that the public expenditure multiplier is
higher in times of crisis than in the upper phase of the economic cycle.
An initial explanation would be that, in times of crisis, the financial
fragility of part of the population translates into a higher propensity to
consume, which makes demand support policies more effective. A
second explanation is that, in times of secular stagnation, the over-
abundance of savings contributes to the low natural interest rate in
Wicksell's sense,4 and that weak demand leads to disinflationary or
Chart 7. Implicit monetary rate (2006-2015)
Source: Wu and Xia (2016).
3. For a review of the literature, see the survey by Le Garrec and Touzé (2017b).
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Gilles Le Garrec and Vincent Touzé80even deflationary pressures. Another reason for the effectiveness of
stimulus policies is their ability to raise inflation to a level sufficient to
render nominal rigidities inactive.
According to the latest OECD forecasts, the United States and the
euro zone are expected to return to a normal level of output in 2018
(Chart 1). However, this return to normal must be put in perspective,
because it not only is relying on an increase in demand but also on a
reduction of potential growth, and therefore of supply (Chart 2). In
addition, low long-term interest rates do not point towards a quick
return to normal inflation, which led Summers to say in 2017 that
“secular stagnation is the defining economic problem of our time”.
2. The Identification of the Secular Stagnation Equilibrium
2.1. The importance of modelling
The stakes for economic analysis are multiple. Although the post-
Keynesian models of the 1960s and 1970s were not able to deal with
post-oil crisis episodes of stagflation, it seems that the break made in
the 1980s by the new applied macroeconomics, based on expecta-
tions grounded in rational anticipations and microeconomics, has also
left many disappointed hopes in terms of the predictability and anal-
ysis of crises (Mankiw, 2006; Woodford, 2009). In particular, the
standard approach of economic fluctuations focuses almost exclusively
on local dynamics around a long-term equilibrium that is considered
unique and stable. The long-term level of production is then guided by
supply. In this kind of configuration, the solutions to support a produc-
tive potential that is too low involve freeing up the factors of
production by fighting rigidities and encouraging investment to boost
productivity. Without going into detail, we could think of any policy
favouring investment in R&D (Aghion and Howitt, 1998) or in human
capital (education, training, apprenticeships – Lucas, 1988; Cohen and
Soto, 2007).
The possibility that a demand shock may have a persistent effect is a
major challenge for macroeconomics. Indeed, in its current consensus,
long-term phenomena can be explained only by supply factors. More
4. The natural interest rate in the sense of Wicksell (1989) is the one observed when there is a
balance of supply and demand across all markets, and therefore full employment. When markets are
not in equilibrium, the observed money rate is not equal to the natural interest rate.
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capital at the heart of the process of economic growth: the unutilized
part of today's income is invested in the productive capital of tomorrow
(Solow, 1956). It also highlights the importance of factor productivity.
Therefore, if we admit that the economic crisis may have permanently
damaged this productivity, then this will also generate a fall in invest-
ment and accumulated capital. We immediately see the limits of this
explanation for dealing with key issues in the 2008 crisis. Indeed, the
weakness of supply should have an inflationary effect, whereas we are
seeing low inflation. Moreover, if we characterize the crisis in the
standard model by a negative demand shock that is capable of retran-
scribing the weakness of inflation, this effect can only be transitory
since a demand shock can only initiate temporary fluctuations around a
stationary equilibrium, which is assumed to be unique and stable. The
persistence of the crisis is left unexplained. In the end, the symptoms of
the 2008 economic crisis argue for approaches that are based on the
existence of multiple equilibria and / or regime switching. In models
like this, the crisis would consist of a transition from a full employment
equilibrium to a notoriously inefficient equilibrium that would translate
into a lower long-term level of production, weak inflation and high
unemployment.
The long stagnation arising from the crisis thus highlights both a
macroeconomics based on numerous market imperfections to provide
the basis for macroeconomic imbalances (Benassy, 2003) as well as the
need to understand the mechanisms underlying global macro-
dynamics to go beyond purely local approaches. This change of
perspective is especially important as economic policy recommenda-
tions can be affected
2.2. The Eggertsson and Mehrotra model (2014)
The model developed by Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) is part of
this conceptual renewal aimed at understanding the multiplicity of
equilibria and the persistence of crises. In addition to the full employ-
ment equilibrium, they highlight what is called a secular stagnation
equilibrium that is characterized by a persistent output gap and defla-
tion. Their model is based on the consumption and savings behaviours
of agents with finite lives in a context of a rationed credit market and
nominal wage rigidity. To this end, they use an overlapping genera-
tions model (Samuelson, 1958; Diamond, 1965; Galor, 1992). In this
Gilles Le Garrec and Vincent Touzé82economy, households live in three periods: in the first period, they
borrow to consume; in the second, they work, consume, repay their
credit and save; in the third, they consume their savings and income.
As for the monetary policy conducted by the central bank, it consists in
setting the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule. This theo-
retical framework makes it possible to go beyond the model of
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) with agents with infinite life horizons,
which is not able to explain the persistence of the crisis. Eggertsson and
Mehrotra (2014) then show how taking into account agents who are
positioned differently in their life cycles, in a context of credit rationing
and nominal rigidity, makes it possible to obtain a stationary, and
therefore lasting, secular stagnation-type equilibrium.
Their model has the great merit of explaining the mechanisms for
the descent into secular stagnation. According to this approach,
secular stagnation was initiated by the 2008 economic and financial
crisis. The crisis was associated with households' excess debt, which
was reflected during the crisis by credit rationing to these same house-
holds. In this context, credit rationing led to a fall in demand and
excess savings. As a result, the equilibrium real interest rate falls. To
counter the low inflation associated with depressed demand, the
monetary authorities must then reduce their key rate, but such a policy
is possible of course only when the nominal rate associated with
ensuring that the inflation target can be hit is positive, that is, if the
equilibrium interest rate is not too negative. If this is not the case, then
conventional monetary policy becomes inactive as it comes up against
the zero lower bound constraint (ZLB) on the nominal rate. In this
configuration, it is no longer possible to hit the inflation target, leading
the economy into a zone of low inflation, or even deflation. In this
latter case, nominal downward wage rigidity translates into higher real
labour costs and thus lower labour demand from firms. As a result,
unemployment steadily rises. The interaction between deflation and
nominal wage rigidity is at the heart of the result obtained, and
explains why there is no force pushing back towards a full employment
equilibrium.
2.3. Accumulation of capital and transition dynamics (Le Garrec and 
Touzé, 2015 and 2016b)
In the model proposed by Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), there is
no accumulation of capital. Therefore, the underlying dynamics is char-
acterized by adjustments without transition from one stationary
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credit crunch, and vice versa if the credit constraint is loosened).
To extend their analysis, we considered (Le Garrec and Touzé, 2015
and 2016b) the accumulation of physical capital as a prerequisite for
any productive activity. More specifically, individuals are expected to
borrow when they are young (first period of life) to invest in a produc-
tive activity that will be effective in the next period (second period of
life). This way of modelling the accumulation of capital fits into the
standard framework of growth models (Samuelson, 1958; Solow,
1956). In this way, the overall dynamics of the economy is character-
ized by a predetermined variable, capital, and a free variable, inflation.
The dynamics of capital is based on a Solow-type (1956) accumula-
tion mechanism,5 while the level of inflation is determined by Fisher's
equation (1933). The latter links the nominal interest rate set by the
central bank with the real return on capital obtained at equilibrium on
the financial market. Since the central bank sets the nominal policy rate
according to observed inflation, it follows that the level of current infla-
tion depends on expectations about the future state of the economy in
terms of inflation and accumulated capital.
This theoretical framework makes it possible to characterize the
long-term convergence with the transient dynamics and thus not to be
limited to the study of stationary states alone. It also helps in examining
how fiscal policy can promote inflationary pressures that are beneficial
to the economy but also lead to an unfavourable crowding out of
private investment.
Chart 8a illustrates the dynamics of the fall into secular stagnation
following a tightening of credit at date t = 0. Starting from a situation
of full employment characterized by an initial capital level, denoted kFE,
and a rate of inflation at its target level (denoted  *), shown that if the
credit crunch is sufficiently large then the equilibrium interest rate
becomes sufficiently negative that it is no longer possible to actively
pursue a conventional monetary policy. 
In this case, the only equilibrium the economy has is a secular stag-
nation type, and it plunges into recession with underemployment of
the labour factor (unemployment induced by nominal rigidity) associ-
ated with production that is below its initial potential (decline in the
5. In each period, a portion of the output is saved and invested in capital. The latter will be used in
producing during the next period.
Gilles Le Garrec and Vincent Touzé84stock of productive capital) and a negative inflation rate (deflation)
denoted Stag < 0. If we assume that initially the economy is at its
stationary level of full employment, following the first period when the
capital cannot be adjusted since it is already installed, the latter will
then decrease to directly reach its new equilibrium level of secular stag-
nation denoted kStag.
6 It is worth noting that the level of deflation over-
adjusts at the moment of the shock. Indeed, since the installed capital
does not adjust instantaneously, there is a higher supply, which results
in stronger deflation. Deflation then adjusts to a lower level.
Chart 8. Dynamics of entering and exiting secular stagnation: profile of capital 
and inflation trajectories
Source: Le Garrec and Touzé (2016b).
6. Technically speaking, this adjustment is due to the presence of an eigenvalue equal to zero (the
other being greater than unity which guarantees a determinate equilibrium).
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and 8b) shows an asymmetry. Thus, in Chart 8b, which characterizes
the credit constraint loosening to return to its initial level, we observe
that capital takes time to return to its initial level while the entry into
secular stagnation is immediate (Chart 8a). In other words, the fall into
secular stagnation seems to take place significantly faster than the
process of exiting the crisis. This observation suggests that economic
policy interventions to combat secular stagnation must be made as
quickly as possible.
3. Efficiency of Economic Policy in the Age of Secular 
Stagnation
The secular stagnation equilibrium thus highlighted, as in
Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) and Le Garrec and Touzé (2015,
2016b), and contrary to Krugman and Eggertsson (2012), is an equilib-
rium that will persist as long as the tight credit lasts. From this point of
view, active policies to counter the scarcity of credit, all other things
being equal, are crucial for combatting secular stagnation. But the
conditions for a secular stagnation equilibrium are not due solely to the
effects of a financial crisis. Excess savings that lead to negative real
interest rates can also result from other factors, such as the aging of the
population. The latter is characterized by a decrease in the growth of
the workforce as well as an increase in life expectancy:
— The reduction in the growth of the labour force hinders
investment needs, which reduces the demand for capital.
— A longer life expectancy increases the need for life cycle
consumption, which requires greater savings.
These two effects cumulate to favour an excess of savings.
In addition to the stabilization of the financial markets, any other
economic policy that could prove effective in fighting unemployment
must therefore be considered: first and foremost, monetary and fiscal
policies, but also more structural policies aimed at making the labour
market more flexible and promoting productivity.
3.1. Structural policy: Keynesian paradoxes in a supply model
First of all, to reduce unemployment one naturally thinks of policies
that promote productivity: training, innovation and investment.
However, in secular stagnation, this leads to a paradox that was first
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will in fact reduce aggregate employment in equilibrium”. More gener-
ally, in a configuration of the secular stagnation type, any increase in
productivity leads to recessionary effects in the economy because it
generates deflationary pressure. As a result, since monetary policy is
constrained by a zero bound on nominal interest rates, deflation is
accompanied by an increase in the real interest rate, which tends to
reduce demand at equilibrium. On the other hand, rising productivity
has a positive impact on full employment output, even if the actual
impact is reversed in a state of secular stagnation.
Second, making the labour market more flexible is often considered
in fighting against unemployment. However, in secular stagnation, a
decrease in nominal wage rigidity also tends to reduce the level of
output and push up unemployment. Indeed, this wage deflation policy
also weighs on households' purchasing power, which reduces their
demand and tends to lower inflation expectations, which in turn favours
greater deflation and therefore a downturn in economic activity.
3.2. Monetary policy: inflation target and instability of anticipations
To get out of secular stagnation, the monetary authorities could go
for a policy aimed at raising the inflation target  * as advocated by
Blanchard et al. (2010). However, Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) as
well as Le Garrec and Touzé (2015, 2016b) show that raising the target
too little does not make it possible to exit the secular stagnation equi-
librium, which remains unique and stable. However, a sufficient
increase would make it possible to bring back the full employment
equilibrium, but without removing the secular stagnation equilibrium.
The economy would be facing a situation of multiple equilibria. So
nothing indicates that inflation expectations will automatically align
with the target, which poses problems of an instability in expectations,
as the secular stagnation equilibrium is locally determinate. In such a
configuration, anchoring the expectations of private agents to align
with the target is a difficult task for the monetary authorities. For infla-
tion targeting to be effective, it is crucial in particular that the central
bank have sufficient credibility (Woodford, 2004).
The low efficiency of conventional monetary policy poses the need
to develop models capable of accounting for the impact of other, less
conventional forms of monetary policy, such as quantitative easing or
the helicopter currency devised by Friedman (1970).
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the multipliers
Fiscal policy is a natural candidate for breaking out of secular stag-
nation. In fact, by supporting demand, any fiscal impulse generates
inflationary pressures which, if they are sufficient, will be able to bring
the economy out of the deflationary zone and subsequently into
secular stagnation. However, it is necessary to be vigilant about the
effectiveness of such a policy. First, if it is financed by debt, it can
further increase an already high level of debt, which can pose signifi-
cant solvency problems. Second, if it is financed by taxes, it can have a
negative impact on capital accumulation and thus depress potential
GDP. So there may be a trade-off between “exiting from secular stag-
nation” and “the accumulation of capital”. We highlight this by
studying the fiscal multiplier:
where s is the savings rate.  
The size of the multiplier depends crucially on the variation in
private investment (and thus on capital accumulation) in response to
the fiscal stimulus. If investment increases, then the multiplier is greater
than one, meaning that fiscal policy is effective.
The fiscal stimulus has two effects on investment. On the one hand,
if the rise in aggregate demand helps to avoid deflation, the gain in
efficiency (nominal rigidities become inactive) leads to an increase in
household income and demand for capital. On the other hand, the rise
in tax-financed public spending reduces the disposable income to be
saved, which pushes up interest rates and crowds out private
investment.
When the crowding out effect is weak, after-tax household income
rises and the economy accumulates capital. The fiscal multiplier is then
greater than one, marking an effective policy (Chart 9a). In contrast,
when the fiscal stimulus is too large, after-tax household income
declines and the crowding out effect depresses investment. The fiscal
multiplier is then less than one even though the economy has moved
out of a state of secular stagnation (Chart 9b). The capital accumulated
in the state of full employment is then lower than that accumulated
under the secular stagnation regime: kFE < kStag.
Δ Private Investment Δ Production
Δ Public Spending Δ Public Spendings
1
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Even if over time certain features of the crisis seem to fade, its
impact is lasting (reduction of potential), and the resort to fiscal policy
in a context of high public debt as well as to unconventional monetary
policies raises questions about the nature of the crisis and its impact on
the functioning of the economy. Modelling the secular stagnation
equilibrium is therefore a promising avenue for research.
The secular stagnation hypothesis and the formal study of its
dynamics thus invite us to rethink the analysis of classic macroeco-
nomics, and therefore the conception of economic policy. In our
approach, following Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014), based on two
Chart 9. Fiscal impulse and exiting secular stagnation
Note: The fiscal impulse is permanent and begins at t = 0.  yt denotes the level of production at the date t and G the
volume of public expenditure. 
Source: Le Garrec and Touzé (2016b).
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Macroeconomics in the Age of Secular Stagnation 89types of market imperfections that hit, respectively, the credit market
(rationing) and the labour market (nominal rigidity), the emergence of
a nominal rate that is close to zero (zero lower bound) raises concerns
that “conventional” monetary policy, which is based mainly on setting
a key rate, will lose its effectiveness. In a context where the effective
inflation rate and the full-employment equilibrium interest rate are
negative, macroeconomic dynamics can lead to trajectories of perma-
nent underemployment that are synonymous with secular stagnation.
The lessons of this approach are multiple. First, to avoid the ZLB,
there is an urgent need to create inflation while avoiding speculative
asset “bubbles” (Tirole, 1985), which may require special regulations.
The existence of a deflationary equilibrium poses questions about the
validity of monetary policy rules that focus too much on inflation
(Benhabib et al., 2001). Second, one must be wary of the deflationary
effects of policies aimed at increasing potential output. The right
policy-mix could be to support structural policies with a sufficiently
accommodating monetary policy. Reducing savings to raise the real
interest rate (for example, by facilitating access to credit) is an inter-
esting avenue, but the negative impact on potential GDP must not be
overlooked. There is an undeniable trade-off between getting out of
secular stagnation and not depressing capital accumulation (crowding
out effect), and therefore the economy's long-term productive poten-
tial. One interesting solution might be to finance infrastructure,
education and R&D policies (higher productivity) through public
borrowing (raising the equilibrium real interest rate). Indeed, a strong
investment policy (public or private) could make it possible to satisfy a
twofold objective: to support aggregate demand and develop the
productive potential.
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